Adam Smith and the Conspiracy of the Merchants by Sagar, Paul
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/23801883.2018.1530066
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Sagar, P. (2018). Adam Smith and the Conspiracy of the Merchants. Global Intellectual History.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2018.1530066
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
 1 
Adam Smith and the Conspiracy of the Merchants 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith famously declared that ‘People of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a 
conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices’.1 Given the 
rhetorical combativeness of this most forthright of accusations, it is unsurprising that it is 
well known. What is less well known, however, is the full extent to which Smith believed 
such a ‘conspiracy’ to obtain, how he believed it came about, and why it would prove 
highly resistant to effective political control. The goal of the following is to bring this 
more clearly into view.2 For whilst nobody even passingly familiar with Smith’s works 
will be surprised to hear that he exhibited a profound hostility to the merchant classes, 
what remains unexplained in the specialist literature is why and how Smith thought the 
merchants were able to exert such disproportionate influence in modern societies. To 
understand this better, we need to place Smith’s hostility to the merchants in the context 
of his account of psychological authority, and the development of different forms of 
political organization as generated by the convoluted social and economic developments 
of not just European, but global, history. In turn, however, we must also come to 
recognize Smith’s condemnation of the merchants as ultimately Janus-faced: his hostility 
is qualified when placed in the context of disastrous political failures, as experienced in 
both the ancient world and more recent European imperial expansionism. In other words, 
when it comes to Smith and the merchants we must take a deeper look at what appears 
already familiar. In doing so we come to see that much more is going on in his thought 
than has yet been appreciated.  
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Smith’s accusation of conspiracy appears not in Book IV of the Wealth of Nations 
– where the bulk of his self-described ‘very violent attack’ on the whole commercial 
system of Great Britain takes place – but in Book I’s technical discussion of labour and 
stock accumulation.3 This by itself is not especially remarkable: the immediate context is 
Smith’s critique of apprenticeships and incorporation, part of his analysis of why the 
‘Policy of Europe’ has generated artificial inequalities in the division of labour and stock, 
and which he is explicit he will go into more detail regarding after Book III’s explanation 
of the unnatural and retrograde development of modern European economic 
development. More remarkable, however, is what Smith immediately goes on to say in 
Book I about what might be done regarding the merchants’ conspiratorial activities:  
It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be 
executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot 
hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do 
nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.4 
Smith follows this up with a series of apparently straightforward recommendations for 
altering policy so as not to provide needless opportunities for the merchants to conspire – 
principally the abolishing of corporations, and the promoting of genuine competition. Yet 
he then immediately leaves the subject, turning to discuss the distortion of the market via 
educating too many people in oversubscribed trades. This turning away might be 
puzzling, however, to those who know what is coming in Book IV. For in Book I, Smith 
appears to suggest that the conspiracy of the merchants can be relatively easily 
ameliorated: political decision-makers should simply reduce opportunities for the 
merchants to conspire, even if considerations of practicality, as well as ‘liberty and 
justice’, mean that total prevention is impossible. But as is well known, in Book IV Smith 
is highly sceptical of the capacity of legislators to do precisely this. Rather than breaking 
up the corporations and other monopolistic structures, governments have tended to side 
with the merchants, turning state policy to their bidding, against the welfare of ordinary 
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people, thus violating ‘that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to 
all the different orders of his subjects’.5 But why? Why don’t agents of government – for 
the good of the broader public, whom it is their principal job to serve – see what the 
merchants are up to and stop them, in just the sorts of ways recommended in Book I?  
A full answer to this question is complex. This is because Smith’s account of the 
conspiracy of the merchants is embedded in his wider assessment of the political 
condition of modern Europe. The result is an intricate account of why political rulers are 
systematically liable to capture by special interests, with entire states potentially captured 
in turn. Recognizing the full scope of Smith’s assessment, however, requires us to pull 
together many threads of his thought, which are woven not just into his two published 
books, but also the student lecture notes on jurisprudence and rhetoric dating from the 
1760s. Accordingly, the following paper begins by examining what Smith has to say in 
The Wealth of Nations regarding the disproportionate influence that merchants exercise 
over the policy of Europe, as well as the pernicious effects that this has had upon wider 
society. The focus is then broadened to consider Smith’s claims about the capacity of 
wealthy elites to psychologically dominate political decision-makers, the crucial 
underlying factor in his explanation of why merchant conspiracies have proved so 
successful in modern commercial societies. It next examines Smith’s analyses of Athens 
and Rome, regimes which on Smith’s view counted as commercial societies, but which 
he believed had been destroyed by worsening misalignments between power and wealth. 
Yet on Smith’s account the subsequent advent of the rule of law ensured a different 
playing out of political contestation in modern European states, and the activities of the 
merchants had to be understood in that very precise context. In turn, Smith’s blistering 
attack on Britain’s imperial exploitation of India is presented as in part a dire warning 
about just how far merchant conspiracies might go, if not subjected to meaningful 
political control. The argument concludes by emphasizing the Janus-faced nature of 
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Smith’s final assessment, connecting this to the late additions made to the final edition of 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments regarding the problem of political judgement. The overall 
aim is to show that if Smith’s famous condemnation of the merchants, and ultimately the 
mercantile system, in the Wealth of Nations is to be fully understood, it must be read both 
backwards and forwards. Backwards, to see how it is embedded in Smith’s underlying 
conceptualization of European history and the rise of modern commercial society. 
Forwards, to his final interventions regarding the centrality of good judgement to the 
‘science of the statesman or legislator’.6 
 
From Private Conspiracy to State Policy: The Merchants and the          
Mercantile System 
Smith’s condemnation of the merchant classes is one of the most prominent features 
of Book IV of the Wealth of Nations. In particular, he there accuses the merchants of 
being responsible for the invention of the specious doctrine of the ‘balance of trade’ – 
i.e. that a nation would grow wealthiest if its exports outstripped imports, so as to 
accrue favourable reserves of money – which despite its economic absurdity, 
constituted the lynchpin of the entire mercantile system. Already debunked by Hume 
as a self-serving chimera, Smith maintained that the merchant classes had propagated 
the notion of a ‘balance of trade’ precisely because it enabled them to deceive 
political rulers into granting vast networks of monopolies, drawbacks, and bounties, 
that enriched the merchants whilst impoverishing the rest of the nation.7 Smith 
likewise located the primary blame for the rise of what Hume termed ‘jealousy of 
trade’ – the introduction of commerce into the arena of reason of state, with decisions 
about economic production subordinated to political calculations regarding 
international competition – as lying squarely with the merchants: ‘Commerce, which 
ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and 
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friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The 
capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and preceding 
century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of 
merchants and manufacturers’.8 In other words, the two most pernicious aspects of the 
mercantile system, when considered both domestically and internationally, could be 
traced back to the conspiring activities of the merchant elites. 
Smith in turn famously described the entire British colonial enterprise in North 
America as establishing a ‘great empire…for the sole purpose of raising up a nation 
of customers who should be obliged to buy from the shops of our different producers’. 
The vast expense of the recently-concluded Seven Years War – indeed, the interest on 
the war debt alone – easily outstripped the entire profit that monopoly trade with the 
colonies could ever hope to secure. And yet all of this was to be paid for by the 
‘home-consumers’ who had been ‘burdened with the whole expense of maintaining 
and defending that empire’, all for the paltry ‘little enhancement in price’ which the 
American monopoly might afford British merchants.9 In Smith’s final judgement, the 
entire North American colonial enterprise – the consequences of which were of 
course exploding spectacularly as Smith was first going into print in 1776 – was not 
fit even for a pathetic nation of shopkeepers, but for something worse: ‘a nation 
whose government is influenced by shopkeepers’. Politicians had come to believe it 
acceptable to sacrifice ‘the blood and treasure of their fellow citizens’ to the interests 
of an elite minority who had captured state policy.10 As Muthu has shown, the result 
was that the influence of the merchants – in particular through the rise of joint stock 
companies and the pivotal role that these played in the imperial affairs of Europe both 
in the West and East – had become so extensive that ‘In Smith’s view, by the mid-
eighteenth century, a state-driven mercantilist system of international political 
economy had been largely transformed into a company-driven mercantilist system’.11 
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Smith’s hostility to institutional power structures, and their distorting effect upon 
commerce and international relations, is thus trained not only on government agents, 
but also upon the vested private interests who have ‘not only colluded with states, but 
captured state power’.12 The result was that the laws perpetuating the mercantile 
system ‘Like the laws of Draco…may be said to be all written in blood’.13 
It is, of course, in Book IV that Smith introduces his now (in)famous metaphor of 
the invisible hand. Yet what remains underappreciated is the extent to which he used the 
invisible hand to single out the activities of the merchant classes for special 
opprobrium.14 Smith employs the ‘invisible hand’ to argue two connected points. First, 
that individuals often promote the good of wider society by performing actions that seek 
only to improve their own private lot, and this (surprisingly) tends to be a more effective 
way of promoting collective prosperity than setting out with that latter goal specifically in 
mind. Second, that because each individual knows his own interests better than a central 
administrator ever can, it is folly for ‘the statesman or lawgiver’ to try and make 
decisions about how to employ capital in domestic industry on behalf of private 
individuals.15 What Smith finds notable about the monopolies that the merchants have 
accrued to themselves is that such measures violate both of the maxims attaching to the 
invisible hand. Whilst aiming to promote the general good, political decision-makers 
inadvertently retard it, making the mistake of thinking that their interference (undertaken 
on behalf of the merchants) can be more effective than letting free competition do its 
work by allowing each to enter and exit competitive markets as directed by private 
interest. The result is that ‘To give the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of 
domestick industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct 
private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all 
cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation’.16 Again, this situation was brought 
about by dominant market actors seeking to rig markets in their own favour. Smith’s 
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appeal to the ‘invisible hand’ was thus directed not simply at overweening governmental 
administrators – as is often supposed17 – but against the merchants who had persuaded 
policy-makers to do their private bidding at the expense of wider society. The invisible 
hand was introduced not simply to make a point about the limits of the knowledge held 
by administrators, especially as compared to the relative efficiency of the price 
mechanism (as more recent Hayekian approaches tend to emphasize), but to draw 
attention to the problem of special-interest lobbying and rent-seeking by those in 
dominant market positions.  
Given all of this, it is not surprising that Smith’s general hostility towards the 
merchant classes is already well known. What has not received sufficient attention, 
however, is the more fundamental question of why the merchants are able to succeed with 
such apparent ease in perpetrating their conspiracies. If, as Smith claims, the doctrine of 
the balance of trade is so obviously specious; if predictions of national impoverishment 
should a favourable balance not be maintained have (as he notes) always been proven 
wrong by the experience of countries and port towns who have opened themselves to 
trade; and if the interest of a nation is evidently harmed rather than helped by adopting 
the policies demanded by the merchants, why don’t rulers see what is afoot, and put a 
stop to such matters? As Smith himself states in his discussion of jealousy of trade, ‘The 
violence and injustice of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of 
human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing 
spirit of the merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be the rulers of 
mankind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected, may very easily be prevented from 
disturbing the tranquility of any body but themselves’.18 If it is indeed ‘easy’ to prevent 
the disturbances affected by the merchants, why do rulers nonetheless frequently fail to 
do so, with states instead being captured by their own mercantile elites? 
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The most immediate and obvious part of Smith’s answer, presented most 
prominently in The Wealth of Nations, focuses on the structural advantages possessed by 
the merchants. As the close of Book I makes clear, when discussing the ‘three great, 
original and constituent orders of every civilized society, from whose revenue that of 
every other order is ultimately derived’, those who live from labouring (i.e. the vast bulk 
of the population) typically lack the education to understand national affairs, and more 
especially lack the influence and opportunity to have their voices heard at a decision-
making level.19 The owners of land ought to possess more clout, but ‘their indolence, 
which is the natural effect of the ease and security of their situation, renders them too 
often, not only ignorant, but incapable of that application of mind which is necessary in 
order to foresee and understand the consequences of any publick regulation’.20 Typically, 
the final of the great orders – merchants and manufacturers – in fact know no more about 
the good of the nation as a whole than the other classes of society, but because they spend 
their lives engaged in ‘plans and projects’ aimed at furthering their own interests, they 
understand those very well, and much better than the other two orders. As a result, the 
merchants’ ‘superiority over the country gentleman is, not so much in their knowledge of 
the publick interest, as in their having a better knowledge of their own interest than he has 
of his. It is by this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently 
imposed upon his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest and that 
of the publick, from a very simple but honest conviction, that their interest, and not his, 
was the interest of the publick’.21  
In practice this structural asymmetry between the orders has been extensively 
compounded by the very success that the merchants have enjoyed in capturing state 
policies for their own interests. As Smith explains after his remark that ‘To expect, 
indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as 
absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it’, this is 
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precisely because ‘Not only the prejudices of the publick, but what is much more 
unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it’.22 The 
violence with which the merchants oppose the removal of their privileges and the 
overturning of mercantilist policies is, Smith says, so ferocious that it would be just as 
dangerous to systematically oppose the merchants as to dismantle Britain’s standing army 
and turn its leading officers out of doors. Explicitly comparing the ‘tribes’ of merchants 
to an ‘overgrown standing army’, Smith explains that this class has entrenched its power 
so as to become ‘formidable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the 
legislature’. The predicament for politicians is that anybody who goes against the 
merchants will suffer ‘the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults’ as 
well as ‘real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious and disappointed 
monopolists’. By contrast, politicians who cozy up to the mercantile classes will not only 
get an easy ride, but acquire ‘the reputation of understanding trade’ as well as ‘great 
popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of 
great importance’.23 This process of power consolidation was supplemented by jingoistic 
tub-thumping: merchants ensured that it was against foreign economic competition that 
‘national animosity’ was ‘most violently inflamed’, further extending their pernicious 
influence over the policy-making of nations.24 
Yet in addition to these direct answers in The Wealth of Nations regarding how 
the merchants had managed to turn their private conspiracies into the foundations of 
national political economy and international strategy, Smith had a deeper story to tell. We 
are pointed in its direction by his remarks that the merchants ‘by their wealth draw to 
themselves the greatest share of the publick consideration’, and that it is precisely their 
‘numbers and wealth’ that renders them ‘of great importance’.25 For in Smith’s 
underlying psychological account of the foundations of political societies, it was 
precisely wealth that had an especially important – and dangerous – role to play.  
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Lessons from History: Wealth, Power, Law 
In order to understand why Smith thought that the merchants were so successful in 
capturing state policy in modern Europe, it is necessary to locate the analysis of the 
Wealth of Nations in reference to his wider political thought, which is itself dependent 
upon Smith’s assessment of the historical conditions from which differing political 
conditions arose. In particular, we must pay attention to Smith’s account of the fates of 
Athens and Rome, as well as the subsequent rise of Europe’s modern monarchies. This, 
however, first requires us to consider Smith’s ‘stages’ theory of economic development, 
his account of how authority operates in the psychologies of the ruled, and his 
explanation of how politics plays out in different socio-economic contexts. Once this is 
done, we will be in a position to appreciate the full extent of the ‘conspiracy’ Smith 
believed the merchant classes to have perpetrated.  
In Chapter IV of Book I of the Wealth of Nations, Smith states that once the 
division of labour has been widely enough established, ‘Every man thus lives by 
exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be 
what is properly a commercial society’.26 This is Smith’s technical definition of 
‘commercial society’, a phrase he uses only twice in the entire published works, but 
which is now widely read as constituting the fourth and final ‘stage’ in his account of the 
natural progress of economic development.27 Yet focusing tightly on this definition 
proves to be highly revealing when put into the context of Smith’s account of earlier 
stages of economic development.28  
In the first of Smith’s stages, people survived in small bands by hunting and 
foraging. They had no notions of property, and barely any of government.29 In the 
second, that of nomadic shepherds, subsistence came from the maintenance of large 
pastoral flocks, and subsequent explosions of inequality arising from increases in wealth 
 11 
led to the invention of notions of property, government, and third-party judicial 
arbitration as initially dispensed by local chieftains.30 The third stage involved a shift 
towards geographically static populations, the bulk of whom were maintained by the 
direct cultivation of land and non-nomadic pasturage. (Legislative assemblies likely 
originated around this time, as checks were needed to control the arbitrariness of judges 
grown dangerous from their power to extract tribute.31) The fourth stage – commercial 
society – consists by contrast of a highly advanced point of economic development where 
the majority of individuals do not themselves need to directly secure their means of 
subsistence (i.e. hunter-gathering, pasturage, or farming) via personal toil. Instead they 
secure their means of subsistence (and beyond, into the realm of above-subsistence 
goods, the technical term for which remains ‘luxury’, albeit stripped of its earlier negative 
moral connotations) via the exchanging of relatively refined goods and services. These 
are the results of the widespread advent of the division of labour, the motor of all 
advanced economic progress, or in Smith’s term, ‘opulence’.32  
The first thing to note is that on Smith’s account commercial society is not simply 
characterized by trade, either internally or externally. All human societies will have 
engaged in material exchange to varying degrees, both with fellow members and with 
neighbouring groups. What sets commercial society apart is specifically how most 
individuals secure their personal subsistence. Second – and crucially – commercial 
society for Smith is therefore by no means a uniquely modern, post-feudal European 
phenomenon. On the contrary, pre-modern societies where most individuals ‘lived by 
exchange’ eminently qualified as commercial societies, and Smith thought that Athens 
and Rome were paradigm cases, as were the economically and technologically advanced 
Chinese dynasties periodically ravaged by Mongol invasion from the eastern steppe, 
before the invention of gunpowder neutered the capacity of nomadic shepherd barbarians 
to reset the progress of civilization.33 We shall return to this point about predecessor 
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forms of commercial society momentarily, for it is of considerable significance to 
understanding Smith’s assessment of the place of the merchants in the peculiar 
instantiation of commercial society that arose in post-feudal Europe.  
Before doing so, however, we must also note that Smith, like Hume, took to 
heart James Harrington’s dictum that in political affairs, ‘the balance of power depends 
on that of property’.34 And also like Hume, Smith founded his political theory on the 
basis of the ‘opinion of mankind’: that all large-scale political processes had to be 
understood through the predominantly voluntary submission of the ruled to rulers (the 
former always outnumbering the latter in strength and number).35 Smith went beyond 
Hume, however, in detailing the mechanics of how authority operated in the minds of 
the ruled, leading them to submit to the commands of those who became successfully 
established as superiors, the phenomenon which the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
described as ‘the habitual state of deference’ that individuals paid to ‘those whom they 
have been accustomed to look upon as their natural superiors’.36  
The two most basic mechanisms of natural authority were superiority of 
individual abilities, and superiority of age.37 In the primitive hunter stage these were the 
entire basis of all political authority. But with the advent of shepherding societies, 
dramatic increases in the wealth possessed by chieftains meant that wealth itself emerged 
as a predominant source of authority.38 Finally, hereditary lineage – which presupposed 
economic inequality, and hence authority based in wealth – arose as a claim to other 
men’s submission, something proved by the fact that the histories of most shepherding 
peoples consisted almost entirely of genealogies.39 In all societies advanced beyond the 
stage of hunters, more immediately visible and permanent external signs of authority 
were needed than the nebulous qualities of age and ability, not least thanks to the rise of 
the need for government due to increases in wealth inequality and the invention of laws 
as a way of protecting the rich from the depredations of the poor.40 Hence wealth and 
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lineage became entrenched in shepherding, but also agricultural, societies, as sources of 
authority. For the most part, however, these were attached to the present possessors of 
political office, and therefore of established political power.   
Although Smith does not state the point explicitly – and for this reason, perhaps, it 
has hitherto not been recognized in specialist treatments of his work – it is central to 
Smith’s analysis of the politics of commercial societies that at this, the most advanced 
stage of socio-economic development, things become different with regards the 
conjunction between wealth, political office, and power. This is because in commercial 
societies the division of labour, and the resulting processes of exchange from which most 
individuals live, inaugurate the possibility for individuals who are not the traditional 
holders of political office to become extremely wealthy. But this means that the newly 
rich are able to use their wealth in order to exercise authority over the minds of peers – 
something that was traditionally the preserve of established political leaders.41 And the 
reconfiguration of power’s relation to property, through the growth of wealth held by 
non-traditional elites was, Smith believed, potentially explosive – as the historical record 
made clear.  
To see this we must look not only to Smith’s more famous account in the Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, but to his little-remarked discussion of the socio-economic conditions 
of Athens and Rome in the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Smith there claimed 
that although the dynamics played out differently, both Athens and Rome were 
fundamentally destabilized by the growth of wealth amongst non-traditional elites, who 
did not have direct access to political office, and so subverted the authority of established 
power-holders. In Athens, the nobility originally dominated: ‘The Ballance of Wealth and 
Rank on their side gave them also the Ballance of Power’.42 Expanding economic 
prosperity, however, meant that in time ‘Commerce gave the lowest of the people an 
opportunity of raising themselves fortunes and by that means power’. Because democracy 
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opened offices to all individuals, the nouveaux riche grasped for power, their wealth 
enabling them to have ‘equal weight with the People’.43 This ultimately resulted in a loss 
of martial capacity, as lazy citizens were paid to attend the public law courts and forsook 
military endeavours and genuine civic engagement, becoming easy prey for the flattery of 
ambitious orators. When Philip of Macedon threatened the republic, it by that point 
lacked the capacity to adequately offer resistance. The result was the subjugation of what 
had been the greatest and most formidable commercial society in all of Attica.44  
The case of Rome was more complex, and played out over a longer period, but 
Smith’s assessment was that the origins of the Republic’s destruction lay in the rise of the 
‘Populares’, demagogues who cynically appealed to those citizens left behind by the 
explosion of wealth generated by successful foreign conquest, but subsequently 
monopolized by the ‘Optimates’.45 The internal unrest unleashed by the conflict between 
these two groups eventually led to the dictatorship of Sulla, and later Caesar’s abolition 
of the Republic after the collapse of the Triumvirate. Thus, alongside Smith’s more 
famous analysis from the Jurisprudence lectures that it was luxury that eventually 
brought down the Roman Empire due to its enfeebling of military capacity and the 
rapacious attentions of the German barbarians that it generated, he maintained that the 
Roman Republic was first destabilized, and ultimately destroyed, by the centrifugal 
political forces unleashed by advanced economic development – in Smith’s technical 
taxonomy, by ‘commercial society’.46 
Modern Europe, however, was different. This was due to accidents of history 
having ensured that the dynamics of politics in modern commercial societies played out 
differently to those of the ancient world. Once we see this, the nature of the merchants’ 
modern conspiracies comes more clearly into focus – but also takes on a different aspect. 
As Smith made clear in Book III of the Wealth of Nations, the economic and political 
development of modern Europe had been ‘unnatural and retrograde’.47 This was because 
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modern Europe had grown out of the feudal regimes founded on the ruins of Rome. In 
particular, that in economic terms European states had not followed a ‘natural’ (i.e. 
analytically logical, without the influence of real-world contingent historical accidents) 
process of development, which presupposed a solid agricultural base being established 
prior to the development of refined manufactures in the towns. Things had instead been 
the other way around, a product of modern Europe starting mid-stream in its economic 
development due to the collapse of Rome having left behind pockets of advanced 
manufacturing in southern European city-states. These outposts of economic 
advancement had injected their refined manufactured goods into the rising feudal, 
agricultural-based, monarchies erected by the descendants of the Germanic shepherd 
conquerors, generating the retrograde progression of modern European development.48 
This led to serious problems of imbalance in European economies – but these had to be 
lived with and worked around (rather than, as the French Physiocrats hubristically 
supposed, being forcibly reversed by the hand of the legislator).49  
In political terms, modern Europe was therefore a story not of ancient republics, 
but the legacy of gothic Shepherd nations, who had settled on the rubble of Rome. Here 
Smith broadly agreed with Montesquieu’s basic analysis in his 1748 Spirit of the Laws: 
the future of European politics was northern and modern, not southern and ancient.50 
Isolated city-states of the sort found in Italy and Switzerland were not models of correct 
political formation, but chance survivors of the barbarian holocaust: ancient relics in a 
modern world, soon to be swept away. The future of European politics was not small 
republics concentrated in individual cities, but large modern monarchies spread across 
great territories, characterized by large internal inequalities of rank and fortune, whilst 
operating large commercial trading economies.51 
This mattered enormously. As is well known, Smith saw modern liberty as having 
arisen via the ironic and unintended effects of luxury. Although luxury brought down the 
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Roman Empire, it later ended the backwards and stagnant feudal societies of western 
Europe after the barons shortsightedly traded all of their political influence for ‘trinkets 
and baubles’, i.e. swapping the capacity to hold thousands of retainers for the chance to 
purchase inane status goods.52 The result was the rise of absolute monarchies across 
Western Europe, which were actually an improvement in terms of liberty for most 
subjects, insofar as distant kings were typically less oppressive than local baronial 
tyrants.53 England was a peculiar exception to this general story, as its situation as a 
united island after 1603 meant it could do without a standing army, whilst the unique 
consequences of its mid-seventeenth century civil war led to the rapid rise of Parliament, 
and in turn to the innovation of a constitution which was mixed in form and orientated 
towards preserving the liberties of subjects. England was politically unique, but this was a 
recent development. Prior to the Stuarts, it had been as much an absolutist regime as its 
monarchical neighbours still were.54 
This was the political situation of Europe by the time the merchants rose to 
prominence and began to use their increasing wealth to influence the political decision-
makers of European states. From this, however, we can infer the following to be unstated, 
but crucial, tenets of Smith’s background assumptions regarding the place of the 
merchants in contemporary commercial society. First, the radically non-ancient political 
landscape of modern Europe had proved – completely ironically and without design – to 
be a relatively stable habitat within which the merchants could undertake their nefarious 
activities. The collapse of the power of the barons, and the undisputed preeminence of 
absolutist rulers in the wake of the end of feudalism, meant that their private wealth 
notwithstanding, the merchants could neither replace the barons as alternative sources of 
domestic power, nor appeal directly to the general population as a way of contesting the 
authority of the monarch (or in Britain’s case, Crown in Parliament). Instead, the 
ambition of the merchants had to be directed to attempts at influencing established 
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holders of political power, encouraging them to adopt policies that would benefit the 
merchant classes. Using wealth as a psychological lever with which to dazzle those who 
made state policy, as well as exploiting their structural position of advantage with regard 
to knowledge of their own interests, the merchants ultimately achieved great success in 
this regard, as Smith made damningly clear in The Wealth of Nations. Crucially, however, 
they did so whilst working with and through, rather than against, established political 
officeholders. This entailed a sharp contrast with the ancient world, which lacked 
merchant conspiracies in the modern mode, but where growing misalignments between 
wealth and power led to the subversion and destruction of liberty-promoting republican 
institutions. 
Second, modern European politics exhibited a vitally important further stabilizing 
factor that helped to ensure that political forces in modern commercial societies were 
centripetal rather than (as in the ancient world) centrifugal. This was the – again ironic 
and unintended – emergence of the rule of law.55 In the Lectures on Jurisprudence and 
The Wealth of Nations, Smith posited that in the earliest stages of society judging was 
undertaken by political leaders not out of a sense of public duty, but to extract gifts from 
those seeking redress, with predictably problematic results.56 With the innovation of 
legislatures to control such practices, and the resulting evolution of standards of equitable 
and impartial treatment in matters of law, judges became upholders of individual liberty, 
as well as acting as checks to sovereign power, rather than being the ‘terrible sight’ 
signaling extractive demands in return for crooked justice that they were to primitive 
peoples.57 The phenomenon of the rule of law – the long-run outcome of judicial 
independence – was, however, largely unknown in the ancient world, where justice was 
much more unreliable and irregularly dispensed, and where the courts were frequently 
extensions of, rather than restraints on, executive power. Yet as Smith made clear in the 
Wealth of Nations, for each individual to be secure in his or her liberty, ‘it is not only 
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necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it 
should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power’.58 This was an 
innovation only perfected under modern European conditions. 
The nation where the securing of liberty via the rule of law had progressed the 
furthest was, again, Britain. This was another accident of history. As Smith explained in 
the section of his Rhetoric lectures dealing with modern judicial eloquence, British 
monarchs had, like their continental counterparts, quickly grown uninterested in the 
tedious task of the administration of justice, and so had delegated it to paid individuals. 
Over time the stature and status of such individual judges had grown dramatically, and 
they in turn vigorously asserted their independence from sovereign direction. What was 
unique to Britain was emergence of the practice of ruling on cases based on precedent. 
This was the birth of the English common law, which turned out to be a remarkably 
effective restraint on executive decision-making, whilst providing a stable framework of 
evolving rules within which all of society could operate predictably and transparently. 
Smith thus declared that the common law ‘may be looked on as one of the most happy 
parts of the British Constitution tho introduced merely by chance and to ease the men in 
power that this Office of Judging causes is committed into the hands of a few persons 
whose sole employment it is to determine them’.59 Yet whilst Britain was most advanced 
in this regard, the benefits of living under impartial systems of justice were not confined 
to Britain alone, insofar as judiciaries separate from the direct control of executive 
powers also existed in the continental monarchies:  
This Separation of the province of distributing Justice between man and man from that 
of conducting publick affairs and leading Armies is the great advantage which modern 
times have over antient, and the foundation of that greater Security which we now enjoy 
both with regard to Liberty, property, and Life. It was introduced only by chance and to 
ease the Supreme Magistrate of this the most Laborious and least Glorious part of his 
Power, and has never taken place until the Refinement and the Growth of Society have 
multiplied business immensely.60 
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The rule of law was a central plank of modern liberty, and yet it was a historical accident 
found only in modern – and crucially not ancient – commercial societies. It was in this 
context that modern merchants had needed to operate. The result, however, is that 
Smith’s wider analysis of the conspiracy of the merchants is ultimately Janus-faced.  
Whilst there was no doubt that the merchants had degraded the policies and 
polities of modern Europe through their conspiracies against the public, it was also the 
case that modern Europeans had gotten off comparatively lightly. Furthermore, although 
the merchants served to degrade the quality of much political decision-making, they had 
also inadvertently helped promote the shift in power that enabled the rule of law to 
operate by supplying the luxury goods that the barons traded for power, and thus 
promoted a wider social system of decentralized legal arbitration that ultimately kept 
their own degradations from becoming politically destabilizing. The unnatural and 
retrograde path of the historical development of modern European states had chanced to 
create political and legal structures within which the potentially destructive effects of 
wealth’s becoming separated from established political power could be effectively 
contained. The merchants certainly used their wealth and structural informational and 
positional advantages to dazzle and manipulate policy-makers, using the power of 
wealth-generated authority to bend national policy to their sectional demands. But they 
did so by operating broadly within the rule of law, and thus not undermining the stability 
of post-feudal commercial societies. This was no small blessing, as the fates of 
independent Athens and republican Rome proved.  
 
Warnings from India: When Merchants Turn Sovereign  
Such was the situation of modern Western Europeans. Alas, by the close of the eighteenth 
century the merchants had not confined their attentions to Western Europe. Non-
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European, peoples had not gotten off so lightly, and the Wealth of Nations accordingly 
contains Smith’s blistering, and justly famous, condemnation of British imperial policy in 
India. In the light of the above, however, we can read his polemic as not only a 
denunciation of imperial exploitation (which it certainly was), but also as a warning 
about what the merchants were capable of, if left to their own devices.61 India represents, 
in Smith’s thought, a limit case regarding how far the conspiracy of the merchants against 
the wellbeing of the public could be taken, absent the stabilizing controls provided by the 
rule of law. 
Smith was under no illusions about the destructive and oppressive nature of 
European imperial projects.62 The consequences of the British East India Company for 
the territories it governed were listed in Book I as ‘Want, famine, and mortality’, 
themselves the results of ‘tyranny’ and ‘calamity’ (WN I.viii.26). In Book IV, Smith 
described the mercantile system’s manifestation in the East Indies as constituting an 
‘oppressive authority’ based on force and injustice, which ‘deranged’ the allocation of 
stock both at home and abroad, and whose joint stock companies (the principle engine of 
mercantile colonialism) operated exclusive monopolies that were ‘destructive’ to those 
countries ‘which have the misfortune to fall under their government’.63  Smith was well 
aware that the western territories not had gotten off any lighter – indeed, arguably the 
reverse. This was easily forgotten by contemporary observers, thanks to the differing 
histories of colonialism having produced different results and states of oppression in the 
observable present. But remembering these differing histories was crucial to 
understanding why the experiences of the East and West diverged by the late eighteenth 
century. 
When the Europeans discovered North America, they found a people who were 
less economically advanced than those of the East Indies. The Native Americans were, in 
Smith’s schema, mostly in the condition of hunters, the Indians mostly shepherds – ‘and 
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the difference is very great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters whom 
the exact same extent of equally fertile territory can maintain’.64 The result was that 
Europeans were able to apply their superior military force against the indigenous North 
American populations, rapidly committing genocide whilst forcing survivors west, 
clearing indigenous lands for settlement by white populations. In the East, by contrast, 
larger and more robust native populations could not be so easily wiped out or displaced, 
and instead had to be ruled over. This led to the different ‘genius’ of the mercantile 
system’s colonial manifestations in West and East under British rule, founded on 
different species of original injustice.65 In the former, the initial injustice of the ‘savage’ 
policy of murder and displacement paradoxically gave way to a more gentle (if highly 
economically inefficient and unjustifiable) form of colonial settler rule, where the 
European merchants and sovereigns saw these colonial populations as fellow citizens of 
the mother country, entitled thereby to comparable levels of defence and care.66 By 
contrast, the subjugated populations of the East were viewed not as fellow citizens 
deserving equitable treatment, but as mere resources for the extraction of gain by the 
merchant monopolies granted authority over conquered territories. The results were 
catastrophic for indigenous populations. 
Part of the problem was an outgrowth of the general misalignment between the 
interests of the wider people versus that of the merchants. Employees of the East India 
Company – i.e. private merchants – aimed simply to extract as much short-term profit 
from their administrations as possible. What they failed to realise was that in ruling over 
subjugated populations they ceased to be just merchants, and instead became de facto 
sovereigns. This meant that their real interest was in improving the value of land, and 
thus in turn the growth of wages and stock, so that the territory that they ruled over could 
prosper, and they in turn reap the benefits of an economy in which opulence was 
increasing. Yet because the merchants saw themselves as British, and India as simply a 
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foreign place to extract profit before leaving for home, they never made this connection. 
For this reason in particular, ‘a company of merchants are, it seems, incapable of 
considering themselves as sovereigns, ever after they have become such’.67 This 
incapacity to switch from a merchant perspective to that of a sovereign virtually 
guaranteed the unjust exploitation of subject populations, who were viewed not as fellow 
citizens, or even humans, but merely resources. 
In fact, the problems ran yet deeper. In the first place, because the administrators 
of the East India Company were precisely ‘a council of merchants’, and not a genuine 
political organization, they found it virtually impossible to exercise legitimate authority 
over the eastern territories.68 The merchants may have possessed wealth, but they shipped 
this straight home, or kept it conspicuously apart from those they ruled over, making no 
pretence that its basis was in anything other than rapine targeted at the ruled. As the 
operatives of the East India Company held no office other than that granted through 
superior force, their authority could not extend beyond naked power – making it barely 
authority at all. The result was that the entire colonial system could ultimately be 
sustained only by violent oppression, meaning its rule was ‘necessarily military and 
despotical’.69 Even worse, there were yet further structural predicaments ensuring that 
corruption and exploitation were virtually inevitable in colonies ruled this way. Whilst 
leading administrators, or indeed the British government, might from afar command a 
more equitable policy towards the Indians, company servants located in the territories 
would always find – in their private or official capacities – opportunities and excuses to 
secure themselves monopolies and unfair advantages, employing force to maintain their 
profits, and extracting what they could from those they found themselves in a position of 
domination over. Because the merchants had no connection with the territories they 
administered beyond the seeking of profit, even well-meaning directives from above 
(which were in practice anyway lacking) would come to little, as the individual 
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imperative at street level was to seek private gain, in a context untethered by any proper 
system of domestic justice enforced by a meaningful sovereign authority.70 The result 
was an abomination: ‘a very singular government in which every member of the 
administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the 
government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it and 
carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent though the whole country 
was swallowed by an earthquake’.71 No wonder Smith’s famous remark that ‘The 
government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all 
governments for any country whatsoever’.72 
Whilst Smith’s assessment of the condition of India has long been recognized for 
its condemnation of oppression and injustice, what also needs to be appreciated is that 
India served as a limit case in Smith’s analysis of the merchants as a central, albeit highly 
problematic, feature of commercial modernity. Due to the Indians being viewed not as 
citizens in need of defence and maintenance by regular sovereign authority, but as mere 
resources for exploitation, the merchants were structurally and psychologically enabled to 
prey upon them, with no institutional or normative system in place to impose meaningful 
restraint. In a state like Britain, by contrast, administered by domestic sovereign authority 
operating under the rule of law, such behaviour could occur only on much smaller scales, 
and where meaningful (if imperfect) mechanisms for redress existed thanks to the 
accidents of preceding history. Nonetheless, one way to read Smith’s polemic against the 
injustices committed in the East is to see that there but for the grace of history, and the 
benefits reaped from past injustices committed, go we – and might go ourselves to greater 
degrees if vigilance is not maintained.  
Yet once again Smith’s final position is replete with complexity. For when he 
wrote that ‘No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and sovereign’, 
this point was intended to cut both ways.73 Whilst merchants made for terrible sovereigns, 
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it was also the case that sovereigns are in general very poor merchants. On the one hand 
this was a product of the structural predicament of ‘Princes’, whom Smith claimed have 
‘scarce ever succeeded’ in becoming ‘adventurers in the common branches of trade’, 
despite often having been tempted to try from a genuine desire to better their nation’s 
condition.74 In the first place, ‘The profusion with which the affairs of princes are always 
managed, renders it almost impossible’ that sovereigns should be capable of dedicating 
themselves with the singularity of purpose, and narrowness of focus, required to secure 
reliable profits in commercial endeavours. Furthermore, their own servants were highly 
unreliable agents of commerce: they ‘regard the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; 
are careless at what price they buy; are careless at what price they sell; are carless at what 
expence they transport his good from one place to another’.75 And of course, behind this 
lay the ironical workings of the invisible hand: sovereigns were much poorer judges of 
where and how to allocate resources so as to secure national prosperity than the 
aggregated but uncoordinated outcome of disparate judgements of utility made by 
individual agents themselves. In other words, sovereigns in modern commercial societies 
could not help but rely upon merchants to a significant degree if they were to genuinely 
attempt to secure the salus populi it was their duty as rulers to pursue. 
 
Conclusion: Political Judgement in Commercial Conditions 
In Smith’s final analysis, merchants are dangerous to a modern commercial society, and 
yet also entirely necessary to its continued operation and flourishing. It was commercial 
activity that generated opulence and freedom, and so the true ‘science of the statesman or 
legislator’ consisted in deciding how best to govern the merchants’ activities, striking a 
balance between granting them liberties to pursue legitimate commercial activities that 
promoted the general wellbeing of the nation, yet applying control when such activities 
became vehicles for sectional private gain at public expense.76 We thus find a direct point 
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of synthesis between Smith’s complex evaluation of the conspiracy of the merchants in 
the Wealth of Nations, and his striking addition to the sixth and final edition of the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments in 1790, where he discusses the ineliminable role of judgement in 
good statecraft. Although often read as Smith’s late-in-life response to the French 
Revolution – which it may well be – Smith’s argument about the intractability of 
judgement goes far beyond a passing commentary on contemporary events. 
Underlying his famous disdain for the ‘man of system’, who is ‘apt to be wise in 
his own conceit’, arrogantly believing that he can reorder society as though the 
individuals that compose it are mere pieces upon a chessboard, but failing to recognise 
that each ‘piece’ has its own principal of motion that inevitably upsets the system-
maker’s plan, Smith was drawing attention to problems facing any sovereign who aspired 
to govern well.77 All good rulers, according to Smith, were animated by two principles. 
First, a ‘certain respect and reverence for that constitution or form of government which 
is actually established’. But second, ‘an earnest desire to render the condition of our 
fellow-citizens as safe, respectable, and happy as we can’.78 When taken by the latter 
spirit of reform, however, the human psyche was apt to become enamored with abstract 
plans promising to sweep away the complex problems of the real world, replacing these 
with an allegedly improved, putatively more rational and ethical, alternative. 
Unfortunately such plans were invariably chimerical: a preconceived system could never 
cope with the difficulties and complexities of the real world, and imposition would 
usually do more harm than good. Such chimeras were particularly dangerous due to their 
capacity to enrage party fanaticism and impose policy via the power of faction and 
groupthink mentality. ‘The great body of the party are commonly intoxicated with the 
imaginary beauty of this ideal system’, meaning that even individual leaders who were 
wise enough to appreciate the great difficulties and dangers of introducing reform ‘dare 
not always to disappoint the expectation of their followers; but are often obliged, though 
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contrary to their principle and their conscience, to act as if they were under the common 
delusion’.79 The good political leader had to exercise judgement as to when reform was 
necessary, versus a continuation of the existing order, whilst also attempting to hold 
themselves independent from the spirit not just of system, but of faction, which were both 
apt to distort or even subjugate good judgement – with potentially disastrous results. 
When we recall Smith’s analysis in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, however, the 
conspiracy of the merchants emerges as posing an even more acute problem than has 
already been noted. For the Wealth of Nations makes clear that it is precisely the 
merchant classes who are amongst those most likely to attempt to exercise power and 
influence over modern rulers. The mercantile elites form factions and cabals, attempting 
to direct government policy to their own private interests – and furthermore, are precisely 
the sorts of actors most likely to celebrate the adoption of abstract plans that reorder 
society in ways that putatively serve the common good, but are in fact calculated to serve 
sectional mercantile interests. Smith’s two prime threats to good political judgement – the 
spirit of system, and the spirit of faction – are thus particularly acute in the context of the 
influence exercised by merchant elites. Thus, whilst Smith may have had France and 
radical reform foremost in his mind when he wrote his late remarks, the depth of his 
insight suggests a longer period of gestation. In which case, his wider analysis of the 
capture of the British state by the mercantile class represents a plausible site of 
intellectual origin for his account of political judgement. In any case, for Smith, a good 
ruler in a modern commercial society – she who understands the ‘divine maxim of Plato’ 
that one is made for the state, not the state for oneself – will be faced with the extremely 
difficult task of not falling for the flattery and wealth-generated authority of mercantile 
power, and preventing state policy from being bent towards private interests.80 On the 
other hand, a considerable degree of mercantile freedom would continue to be necessary 
to secure the prosperity of the nation, insofar as princes make for terrible merchants. On 
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Smith’s analysis, deciding where the balance falls is a task demanding an acute capacity 
for judgement, that cannot be taught through theory, is likely to be possessed only by a 
very few, and yet is essential for good statecraft in a world shaped by the turbulent 
currents of history, politics, and economic exchange.  
The picture that finally emerges is of Smith’s position as altogether less sanguine 
than the still common depiction of him as a relatively blasé believer in the inevitable 
conjunction of commerce with liberty, and the upwards progress of human civilization 
powered by the benign engine of market exchange.81 Likewise, the sheer complexity of 
Smith’s analysis of commercial societies, the Janus-faced place he ascribes to the 
merchants within the historical development of European states, the further complicating 
factor of their behaviour beyond the metropole, as well as the demands and burdens of 
judgement imposed upon rulers, ought all to indicate that, as Craig Smith and Ryan 
Patrick Hanley have recently urged, Smith is not helpfully reduced to either side of a 
contemporary debate about whether is politics is of the ‘left’ or the ‘right’.82 Ultimately, 
Smith’s thought is too subtle for such a crude binary to do justice to, whilst his emphasis 
on the necessity of careful judgement to good political decision-making is diametrically 
opposed to the prescriptive certainty that is the hallmark of ideology.83  
We no longer live under the mercantile system, having moved to something more 
like the ‘system of natural liberty’ that Smith himself supposed was a mere ‘Utopia’, both 
‘useless and chimerical’.84 The story of how that happened has been debated elsewhere.85 
But even if we now live in something more closely approximating Smith’s system of 
natural liberty – insofar as monopolies held by state-backed joint stock companies are no 
longer the ‘genius’ of our present commercial system – none ought to deny the continued 
outsized influence of mercantile, or as we now say, corporate, interests in political 
decision-making.86 We are not as far removed from Smith’s world, in this regard, as we 
might like to think. Politicians remain highly vulnerable to the influence of merchant 
 28 
elites, and whilst liberal capitalist democracies are dependent upon extensive commercial 
freedoms for their continued operation and success, it also remains true that – as Smith 
emphasised – the immediate interests of the merchants frequently diverge from those of 
the other ‘orders’ of society. Good political judgement regarding how to manage this 
state of affairs remains as desirable as ever. Smith, however, helps us to see why such 
judgement is nonetheless in acutely short supply, and why we have much to fear from 
that fact.  
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